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DECOSTER III: NEW ISSUES IN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
During the mid and late 1960s, claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel in criminal trials in-
creased significantly.1 Commentators viewed the
body of law surrounding this new litigation as
unsettled or transitional.2 Uneasiness resulted from
seemingly inconsistent formulations of standards
by which to judge these numerous claims.3 United
States v. Decoster4 (Decoster I1) seemed to offer a
resolution and some guidance in the late 1970s.
The case was seen as a "turning point in judicial
analysis" because it established a set of specific
duties as the standard for determining effectiveness
and treated these duties as constitutional require-
ments.5
This view of Decosler II was premature, for a
contemporary review of the ineffective assistance
of counsel problem reveals substantial reliance by
the other federal appellate courts on the United
States Supreme Court's less specific articulation of
the standard required of counsel. Moreover, the
area of focus of attention has shifted to the alloca-
tion of burdens of proof in these claims and to
what extent the prosecution should have recourse
to the harmless error doctrine. The District of
Columbia Circuit's decision in Decoster III, which
overruled and superceded Decoster II, epitomizes
this shift in judicial inquiry. Decoster III is, for the
time being, the authoritative case in these new
problem areas. Nevertheless, the suggestions made
in Decoster III must be tested against the general
constitutional framework established by the Su-
preme Court for effective assistance of counsel.
I Strazella, Effective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New
Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 443,443 (1977). This
comment examines the constitutional implications of the
right to effective assistance of counsel. For a discussion of
the civil liability of court-appointed counsel, see Com-
ment, Liability of Government-Appointed Attorneys in State Tort
Actions, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 136 (1980).2 Id. See also Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal
Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 109, 111
(1977).
3 See, e.g., Strazella, supra note 1, at 446.
4 No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976) (opinion fol-
lowing remand) [hereinafter cited as Decoster II], reheard
en banc, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Decoster III], cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979).
' Comment, The Constitutional Mandate of Effective Assist-
ance of Counsel: The Duty to Investigate, 6 HoFsTRA L. REV.
245 (1977).
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF THE RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Claims for appellate relief for ineffective assist-
ance of counsel can be brought under either the
fifth 6 or sixth 7 amendments. The earliest claim
regarding the performance of counsel was brought.
under the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. In Powell v. Alabamas the Su-
preme Court held that a defendant's rights in-
cluded an "effective" appointment of counsel.
Prior to the 1960s, lower courts followed the
Supreme Court and held that the due process
clause guaranteed the right to effective assistance
of counsel. 9 The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals developed the "farce and mockery" test
to determine whether this right had been vio-
'U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ......
7 U.S. CONsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his
defense."
a 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell involved the appointment
of the entire Scottsboro, Alabama, bar as counsel for the
"Scottsboro Boys." Until trial no specific appointments
had been made, and none of the lawyers undertook an
investigation of the case. The Supreme Court reversed
the defendants' rape convictions and held that the fifth
amendment required counsel to provide "effective aid in
the preparation and trial of the case." Id. at 71.
9 Bottiglio v. United States', 431F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir.
1970) ("a mockery, a sham, or a farce"); Cardarella v.
United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1967) ("farce
and a mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of
the Court'); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th
Cir. 1965) ("farce, or a mockery ofjustice'); Bouchard v.
United States, 344 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1965) (quoting
Reid v. United States, 334 F.2d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1964))
("farce or a mockery of justice'); Root v. Cunningham,
344 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 866 (1965)
("so transparently inadequate as to make a farce of the
trial'); Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th
Cir. 1962) ("trial becomes mockery and farcical");
O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir.
1961) ("farce and a mockery of justice, shocking to the
conscience of the Court"); Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d
407,427 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953) ("farce
and a mockery ofjustice'); United States v. Wright, 176
F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1949)
("shock the conscience of the Court and make the pro-
ceedings a farce and mockery ofjustice'); Feely v. Ragen,
166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1948) ("travesty of justice').
lated.'0 This test permitted reversal of the convic-
tion only when counsel's substandard performance
rendered the trial a farce and a mockery ofjustice
shocking to the conscience of the court." The policy
behind the farce and mockery test was not so much
the protection of the defendant as the preservation
of the systemic integrity of the trial.' 2 Some courts
continue to adhere to this test.'3
The farce and mockery test imposes a heavy
burden on a defendant seeking appellate or collat-
eral review because he must present evidence of
shocking and outrageous conduct by his counsel.
14
For example, in Jones v. Hufft s a convicted forger
alleged that counsel failed to object to the admis-
sion of evidence of a coerced confession, failed to
call witnesses who allegedly would have established
the innocence of the accused, and most impor-
tantly, failed to comply with the jury's request for
a sample of the defendant's handwriting to com-
pare with the purported forgery. The court held
that such allegations, if proven, would constitute a
farce and a mockery ofjustice because counsel had
failed to represent the accused in any fundamental
respect. 16
In cases where the quality of representation ex-
ceeds that provided injones, the farce and mockery
test is of limited use. Postconviction tactical deci-
sions or the choice of a particular defense theory
fall outside the scope of the test because neither
amounts to a total failure of representation. 7 A
generally high level of representation blemished
only by counsel's inadvertent remark that he was
appointed by the court and had a duty to defend
a guilty client will not constitute a farce or mockery
of justice.is In general, single incidents will not
support a claim of ineffective counsel because the
farce and mockery test is not primarily designed to
protect the individual defendant or further the
" Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
" United States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104,
109 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
12Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14; Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d
667.
" See United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 257-58
(10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Budar, 567 F.2d 192,
201-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); Gillihan
v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 845 (1977); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d
62 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
'4 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d at 669.
5 152 F.2d 14.
16Id. at 15.
17 Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182; Rickenbacker
v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62.
"8 Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974).
truth-seeking function of trials. Rather, this test
gauges the impact of the attorney's behavior on
the trial process. The contemporary expansion of
the right to counsel and the effective assistance of
counsel has been accomplished through the sixth
amendmenti s This approach, in contrast to the
due process analysis, personalized the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel by assuring the defend-
ant of access to and meaningful help from counsel.
Three situations may give rise to sixth amend-
ment violations. The first is where the defendant is
without counsel.20 The requirement that counsel
be appointed for indigent defendants originally
applied only to those charged with federal felon-
ies. 2 1 Gideon v. Wainwright2" incorporated the sixth
amendment into the fourteenth, expanding its cov-
erage to state felony prosecutions. Subsequent de-
cisions extended the requirement to all misde-
meanor prosecutions involving potential incarcer-
ation. 23 In such cases, relief is available to defend-
ants who are clearly guilty. They need not show
that the deprivation of counsel prejudiced the de-
fendant.24 Moreover, the prosecution cannot claim
that the absence of counsel was merely harmless
error because the presence of counsel is fundamen-
tal to the fairness of the trial."
The second situation infringing on the right to
effective assistance of counsel occurs where counsel
is present physically but his effectiveness is im-
paired by judicial or statutory barriers to the ex-
ercise of his tactical or strategic judgment. Such
impairment also may result from court practices
which intrude on the attorney-client relationship.
26
'9 Strazella, supra note 1, at 444-45.
20 Analytically, a defendant could be without counsel
where a state has denied counsel from appearing on
behalf of the defendant, which is quite unlikely since a
statute forbidding the retention of counsel would violate
the sixth amendment on its face. Practically, a defendant
would be without counsel only when unable to pay for
one, i.e., indigent.
21 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see Decoster
III, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979)
(Leventhal, J.).
"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
24Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
25 Decoster III, slip op. at 6 (Leventhal, J.).
2" See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial
court order prohibited consultation between counsel and
defendant during overnight recess); Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853 (1973) (statute gave judge in nonjury trial
power to prohibit counsel's closing argument); Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (statute restricted coun-
sel's discretion on whether to put defendant on the stand);
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The defendant need not show actual prejudice as
a result of this sixth amendment violation. A
presumption of prejudice arises because the govern-
ment, by statute or court order, has shaped the
adversary process to its own (i.e., the prosecution's)
advantage by these practices. Still, because this
type of violation is not as egregious as the total
deprivation of counsel, the conviction will not be
reversed automatically if the prosecution can show
that the resulting prejudice to the defendant, the
constitutional error, was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.ss In other words, constitutional viola-
tion must be inconsequential compared to the over-
whelming evidence of guilt.29
Finally, the sixth amendment may be implicated
where, after counsel has been appointed and there
has been no subsequent interference with his activ-
ities, counsel allegedly renders aid of low quality
and value. The Supreme Court has held that a
violation of the sixth amendment occurs when
counsel's performance is not "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases."
30
In Tollett v. Henderson,31 the Supreme Court re-
viewed a black defendant's habeas corpus petition.
Twenty-five years earlier defendant Henderson
had pled guilty to murder in exchange for a reduc-
tion of his sentence from death to imprisonment
for ninety-nine years. In 1973, Henderson attacked
the validity of the guilty plea, alleging that it was
not "made intelligently and voluntarily with the
advice of competent counsel.' ' 2 The respondent
argued that his appointed counsel's advice and
representation were incompetent because he failed
to question Tennessee's practice of excluding blacks
from grand juries. The Court held that for Hen-
derson to prevail he had to demonstrate not only
the unconstitutionality of the grand jury system,
but also that counsel's advice to plead guilty with-
out questioning the composition of the grand jury
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (statute per-
mitted defendant to make an unsworn statement but
barred counsel from eliciting same testimony on direct
examination).
27 Decoster III, slip op. at 7 (Leventhal, J.).
28 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 22-24.
29See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254
(1969) (violation is harmless error when overwhelming
evidence supports the verdict after offending evidence
has been subtracted).
'9Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 264 (1973)
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71
(1970)).
3411 U.S. 258.
32 Id. at 265.
was outside the normal range of competence of
Tennessee attorneys in 1948.3 The standard for
determining an attorney's competence is therefore
geographically and temporally relative.
The disposition of Tollett v. Henderson can be
contrasted with the outright rejection of an ineffec-
tive assistance claim in United States v. Agurs.3 In
Agurs, the Court briefly dismissed the defendant's
argument that counsel's failure to request the crim-
inal record of a murder victim so harmed the self-
defense theory of the defendant as to constitute
reversible error. Although such conduct seems be-
low the normal level of competence of the time and
place, Agurs can be reconciled with Tollett because
in the former case the defendant based his claim
on the fifth amendment instead of the sixth amend-
ment. As discussed above,35 fifth amendment
claims regarding the assistance of counsel are to be
measured against the farce and mockery test. The
facts alleged in Agurs simply failed to constitute a
substantial outrage upon the integrity of the ad-
versary system.
The indication that the sixth amendment re-
quires a standard different from the farce and
mockery test raises questions regarding the exact
content of a sixth amendment standard, the allo-
cation of the burden proof as to prejudice, and the
possible application of the harmless error doctrine.
The federal appellate courts have given various
responses to each of these questions.
First, sixth- amendment standards seem to vary.
Some courts have followed the general outlines of
Supreme Court decisions and have developed a
negligence standard. For example, the Third Cir-
cuit holds defense counsel to "the exercise of the
customary skill and knowledge which normally
prevails at the time and place."36 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit requires the "customary skill and
diligence that a reasonable attorney would perform
under similar circumstances."37 Related to these
standards is the Seventh Circuit's requirement that
's Id. at 269. The Court quoted a concurring judge of
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: "No lawyer in
this state would have ever thought of objecting to the fact
that Negroes did not serve on the grand jury in 1948."
3' 427 U.S. 97 (1976). It seems odd that in such a
contemporary case the petitioner would rely on the fifth
amendment for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
35 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
36 Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir.
1970).
3 United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir.
1970). For an analysis of Easter, see Recent Trend, The
Changing Federal Standardfor Judging Ineffecliveness of Counsel,
68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 412 (1977).
1980]
the representation meet the "minimum profes-
sional standard' 's 8 and that of the Ninth Circuit
which mandates a "reasonably competent attorney
acting as a diligent, conscientious advocate." 39 All
of these formulations use a "reasonable attorney"
as the measuring stick.
In practice most applications of the negligence
standard relate to situations involving the filing of
motions and the making of timely objections. Thus,
in Cooper v. Fitzharris,40 the court held that a viola-
tion of the sixth amendment occurs when counsel
fails to move to suppress evidence taken in an
illegal search, fails to object to evidence as it is
introduced, and fails to stipulate a client's former
conviction to avoid the introduction of damaging
proof of the conviction. Sometimes more egregious
failures are involved. For example, the Third Cir-
cuit granted an evidentiary hearing where defend-
ant alleged that counsel had failed to undertake
any investigation and to prepare adequately for
trial.4
The Fifth Circuit developed a slightly different
standard, which the Sixth Circuit has since
adopted. These courts require representation by
"counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance., 42 The Fifth Circuit
later indicated that the proper scope of the inquiry
to determine whether the standard has been met
must turn on an examination of the totality of the
circumstances at trial.4 This statement is subject
to several interpretations. It may mean that pretrial
preparation and investigation, as well as trial con-
duct are covered by the standard.
Perhaps in practice this standard is no broader
than the negligence standard. In Nero v. Blackburn,
44
38 United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d
634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
39 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir.
1978). The First Circuit also has adopted a reasonableness
test, United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (tst Cir.
1978).
40 568 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States
v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on failure to file a motion to suppress evi-
dence obtained in an illegal search and seizure and on
failure to object when the tainted evidence was intro-
duced at trial).
"' Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730.
42 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960)
(emphasis in original); cf Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (sixth amendment requires
"counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering rea-
sonably effective assistance").
'3 United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.
1977).
4 597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1979).
the Fifth Circuit applied its standard and upheld
a collateral attack based on ineffectiveness of coun-
sel. The court reversed the conviction and granted
a new trial because defense counsel, who was un-
familiar with criminal procedure, failed to object
to prejudicial statements in the prosecutor's closing
argument. Under the Loiuisiana Criminal Code,
the objection would have been sustained and an
automatic mistrial would have resulted. The Fifth
Circuit rejected the argument that the failure to
ask for an automatic mistrial was a tactical decision
by holding that a tactical decision is ineffective
unless it is an informed decision. Since a "reason-
able criminal attorney" would be knowledgeable
about criminal procedure, there is no practical
difference between the Fifth Circuit standard as
applied in Nero and the negligence standard of the
other circuits.
A third alternative standard is one that formal-
izes the negligence standard by defining the "rea-
sonable criminal attorney" in terms of a set of
specific duties. The Fourth Circuit requires an
attorney to confer with the client, advise him of his
rights and alternative defenses, and to investigate
all relevant matters.4 5 Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit held that counsel must make more than a
perfunctory effort to fulfill his duties.4 6 The District
of Columbia Circuit adopted this checklist ap-
proach in Decoster L47
Supporters of the checklist approach view it as
more meaningful than the vague negligence ap-
proach because it provides appointed counsel with
notice of what is expected. 8 They also claim that
it guarantees indigent defendants a substantial
minimum level of representation.4 9 Nevertheless,
whether this imposition of affirmative duties is
reconcilable with the noncategorical, open-ended
approach taken by the Supreme Court is subject
to question. Defenders of the checklist approach
argue that the checklist merely lists the attributes
of the "reasonable attorney" that are common to
all times and places.' The Fourth Circuit appar-
ently sees no conflict between the checklist ap-
proach and the Supreme Court guidelines since it
4" Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968).
46Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089, 1093 (4th Cir. 1970).47 See text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
' Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v.
Decoster, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 752, 781 (1980).
49 See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U.
CINN. L. REv. 1 (1973). See also Bazelon, The Realities of
Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 836-38 (1976),
for an example of such a checklist.
50 Tague, supra note 2, at 125-27.
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has adopted the latter without overruling its earlier
decision applying the checklist standard. 5'
Perhaps the two approaches are not totally in-
consistent, but they do express different, if not
opposing, attitudes toward the amount of judicial
supervision and review of counsel needed to satisfy
the sixth amendment. The negligence approach
assumes that the profession will police itself suffi-
ciently so that judicial intervention only will be
warranted for the exceptional case. The checklist
approach belies a skepticism about such self-regu-
lation and argues for accountability to the bench.
Most of the litigation in this area concerned
attempts to shift the circuits from the old "farce
and mockery" test to the new sixth amendment
standard. Courts have paid considerably less atten-
tion to what comes after a showing of the breach
of the standard. Assuming that courts settle on one
type of standard of conduct, they still must deter-
mine the relevance of prejudice to the defendant's
case resulting from a violation of the standard,
allocate the burden of proof, and determine the
applicability of the harmless error doctrine. The
Sixth Circuit has held that a presumption of prej-
udice arises from all sixth amendment violations
that cannot be rebutted by a harmless error argu-
ment.52 In effect, the Sixth Circuit has taken the
questionable step of rejecting any distinction be-
tween the triad of sixth amendment violations,
even though the Supreme Court continues to ad-
here to such distinctions.
53
The Eighth Circuit employs a different approach
by holding that when the performance of
counsel has fallen below the required standard "the
seriousness of the constitutional violation must be
judged in terms of the particular factual circum-
stances of that case."' 4 Unlike the Sixth Circuit,
the Eighth Circuit distinguishes an ineffective as-
sistance case from cases where counsel has not been
appointed, or where counsel's representation has
been impaired by government action. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit indicated that in most cases itwas
prepared to require the defendant to demonstrate
some prejudice to his case. Also, the court would
not automatically place the burden of showing a
si Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th
Cir. 1974) ("range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases"). Cf Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at
264 ("range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases').
52 Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1974).
53 See text accompanying notes 17, 23 & 26 supra.
"4 McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir.
1974).
lack of prejudice on the prosecution as the benefi-
ciary of the error.5 The Eighth Circuit attempted
to develop a flexible approach that would shift the
burden of proof by presuming prejudice only where
circumstances such as lapse of time or death or
disappearance of witnesses made the defendant's
inability to prove prejudice consequential. The
Eighth Circuit then would permit the prosecution
to use harmless error analysis as a means of rebut-
ting the presumption that prejudice amounting to
constitutional error has occurred.so
The Ninth Circuit requires the defendant to
demonstrate that the "serious derelictions" of coun-
sel had resulted in actual prejudice to the defense. 57
This court, like the Eighth Circuit, distinguished
effective assistance from government impairment
of the right to counsel. Only the latter is inherently
prejudicial under the sixth amendment. Because
the Ninth Circuit held that ineffective assistance
was not inherently prejudicial, the defendant must
show actual prejudice to establish reversible con-
stitutional error.ss Finally, the court permitted the
prosecution to demonstrate that the error was
harmless.
The Supreme Court has not addressed several
possible solutions to these problems. The various
solutions found in Decoster III now will be examined
in detail. Analysis will locate the Decoster opinions
in the sixth amendment triad constructed here and
will test them against the demands of that frame-
work.
II. THE DEcosTER CASE
Long before the Decoster litigation, the District
of Columbia Circuit employed the "farce and
mockery" test when evaluating ineffective assist-
ance claims. Subsequently, the circuit made a ten-
tative, hesitant shift to a sixth amendment analysis
of the ineffectiveness problem in Bruce v. United
States. 9 Decoster I carried this analysis to an exam-
ination of the content of the sixth amendment
standard.60 Decoster III goes beyond this and ex-
5Ild at 218-19.
57 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 568 F.2d at 1330.
ssJones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14; See Diggs v. Welch, 148
F.2d 667.
59 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
60 The first two phases of the Decoster case have been
heavily noted and commented upon in the literature.
What follows is a synopsis of the first two decisions. For
more background, see Strazella, supra note 1; Tague, supra
note 2; Comment, supra note 5; Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures From Habeas Cor-
pus, 59 VA. L. REy. 927 (1973). The procedural and
factual history of the case is taken, for the most part,
from the plurality opinion.
amines in detail the allocation of the burden of
proof and the applicability of the harmless error
rule. The Decoster litigation parallels the develop-
ment of the law in the area of effective assistance
of counsel.6 '
A word is necessary to clarify the procedural
history of the Decoster litigation. Decoster I was a
direct criminal appeal which resulted in a reversal
of the conviction with a remand for an evidentiary
hearing to determine the effectiveness of the trial
attorney. The government prevailed at the eviden-
tiary hearing, but again lost on appeal in Decoster
H before the same panel that heard Decoster L62
The government's petition for rehearing en banc was
granted and the conviction was finally upheld
because the additional judges outnumbered and
outvoted the former panel majority.6
A. DECOSTER I
On May 29, 1970, three men assaulted Roger
Crump, a soldier, at the corner of 8th and K
Streets, N.W., near the parking lot of the Golden
Gate Bar in Washington, D.C. They held Crump
from behind, threatened him with a razor, and
.took his wallet with $100 in cash.64
Two plainclothes police officers cruising the area
in an unmarked car saw the robbery in progress
and gave chase to the assailants on foot. Crump
and one of the policemen, Officer Box, chased one
of the suspects into the lobby of the D.C. Annex
Hotel, where Box arrested him. The man was
Willie Decoster, and Crump immediately identi-
fied him as one of his assailants. Neither the money
nor the wallet was recovered.65
The defendant was declared indigent, and coun-
sel was appointed. Decoster could not make a
$5000 bond and was jailed.66 During this time he
wrote letters to counsel and Judge Waddy in which
he admitted he had fought with Crump on May
29.67 At trial Decoster claimed he met Crump at
the Golden Gate Bar but had returned to the hotel
61 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, also discusses
the issues of prejudice and harmless error.
62 See Section II, B infra.
63 See Section II, C infra.
6 Decoster III, slip op. at 3 (Leventhal, J.).
6 Id.
6Id. at 32.
6 Decoster's testimony contradicted this fact. Id. at 3-
4. The text of both lettcs is found in the concurring
opinion of Judge MacKinnon, Id. at 36 n.39. They are
reproduced without correction below.
Letter to defense counsel written between May and No-
vember, 1970 (no precise date is known):
200 19th St. S.E.
Wash., D.C.
alone. Yet Eley, one of the codefendants, testified
that he had seen Decoster fighting in the parking
lot. Crump's eyesight had been impaired in an
accident after the assault, and he could not identify
Decoster at the trial. He testified that he was sure
of his identification that night in the hotel lobby.6
The jury found Decoster guilty of aiding and
abetting an armed robbery. Decoster received a
sentence of two-to-eight years6 and at sentencing
made statements acknowledging his involvement
in criminal activities and admitting the substance
of his letter to Judge Waddy.
70
On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit,
the majority raised the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel sua sponte.7' ChiefJudge Bazelon, writing
for the majority, remanded the case for an eviden-
tiary hearing to examine the effectiveness of the
Dear Sir:
As I tried to call you before, but couldn't make
contact, I decided to write again. Its important I
see you, as you are my lawyer and I don't have ways
of fighting my case without you. To get to the point,
I want to file assault charges against my accuse
victim. I think I have as much right as he has, at
least I'm entitle to it. If they can charge me with
robbery while fighting, I think I have as much right
as him and can do the same. As for Elley & Taylor
my accuse partners they can testify their role. Elley
came to my aide when the victim stuck his hand in
his pocket & Taylor was just standing on the side-
walk. I hope you can do something about this as
soon as you get this letter. Please let me know
something. If he can be free so can I.
Willie Decoster
Dorm D.C D.C 162743
Letter to the trial court of November 4, 1970:
Honorable Judge Waddy,
I am an inmate of D.C. Jail who has been incar-
cerated for five month on a charge that has been
change from robbery to arm robbery. The motive
for this letter is to request from the court another
lawyer.... Being an individual of limited education
its only natural for me to protect my innocence and
with the transcript from my hearing which I cannot
obtain because of illegal counseling. I can prove that
I am only guilty of assault by selfdefence....
68Id. at 3-4 (Leventhal, J.).
6 Id. at 4.
70 Decoster III, Id. at 38 n.41 (MacKinnon, J., concur-
ring). At sentencing Decoster told the court:
I just wanted the Court to know that I was sincere
in writing this letter. I feel like I can be-well, I
know I can be rehabilitated which I have did on
my part in having to come to face the facts. It just
seems like, you know-well, really, I left home when
I was at an early age and I didn't have that much
confidence and Ijust hooked up in the wrong places
and in the wrong ways.
71 United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Decoster I].
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trial attorney. Specifically, the majority directed
the trial court to investigate the trial attorney's
amount of preparation, his decision to call Eley to
the stand, and his decision not to interview the
hostile witnesses and the codefendants.
72
The trial court was instructed to compare the
trial attorney's representation of the defendant
with "the reasonably competent assistance of an
attorney as his diligent conscientious advocate.,
73
To give content to this standard, the court adopted
the checklist approach of specifically required du-
ties; duties inspired by the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standards for the Defense Function. 74 The
duties imposed by the court were:
(1) Counsel should confer with his client without
delay and as often as necessary to elicit matters
of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses
are unavailable....
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his
rights and take all actions to preserve them....
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investiga-
tions, both factual and legal, to determine what
matters of defense can be developed.... And, of
course, the duty to investigate also requires ad-
equate legal research.
75
The majority further held that if the trial attor-
ney had violated these duties, the defendant was
entitled to a reversal unless the prosecution could
show an absence of prejudice from the violations.
76
Judge MacKinnon concurred with the major-
ity's articulation of the standard for effectiveness
of counsel but dissented from the allocation of the
burden of proving prejudice.77 He argued that
since the defendant has access to information per-
taining to the claim, it is incumbent upon him to
demonstrate that the violation resulted in actual
prejudice.7'
The effect of the Decoster I holding Nas two-fold.
First, the decision unanimously c tablished the
sixth amendment as the standard for ineffective
assistance claims. Second, the decision adopted the
7Id. at 1202.
73Id
74 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION (1974) .[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
75 Decoster I, 487 F.2d at 1203-04.
76 Id. at 1204. A similar set of duties was required by
the Fourth Circuit in Coles v. Payton, 389 F.2d at 226.
In a later case, Chief Judge Bazelon argued that the
Decoster checklist was a codification of existing law.
United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 488 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
77 Decoster I, 487 F.2d at 1205 (MacKinnon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).78 l
checklist method for formulating a sixth amend-
"ment standard of effectiveness. The court disagreed
over the importance of a showing of actual preju-
dice under the checklist approach. This issue would
become crucial in subsequent litigation of the case.
A motion for a new trial was filed on November
1, 1973. In February, 1974, a three-day evidentiary
hearing was held before Judge Waddy. 79 The evi-
dentiary hearing left unanswered questions that
went to the heart of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The only witness called by the gov-
ernment was the trial attorney who could remem-
ber little detail of the trial three years earlier. The
attorney testified that there was little reason to
conduct anything more than a perfunctory inves-
tigation in light of what the trial attorney thought
was an admission of guilt coupled with overwhelm-
ing evidence unfavorable to Decoster. Decoster
took the stand, but failed to explain the inconsist-
encies between his letters and his trial testimony.
Also, Decoster could produce no names of uncalled
witnesses who would support his claim that he was
in the hotel lobby at the time of the assault on
Crump.
s°
The appellate counsel was at a loss to show how,
even with the minimal defense established by trial
counsel, the defendant was prejudiced by his attor-
ney's performance. The appellate counsel's argu-
ment hinged on the fact that the answers to so
many questions concerning the quality of Decos-
ter's representation were left unanswered that prej-
udice must be presumed unless the government
could demonstrate a lack of prejudice.8' Judge
Waddy rejected this argument and denied the
motion for a new trial.82
B. DECOSTER II
Decoster appealed Judge Waddy's denial of his
motion for a new trial. The court of appeals re-
versed Decoster's conviction with Judge Mac-
Kinnon again dissentingss Chief Judge Bazelon,
again writing for the majority, held that counsel's
failure to conduct a full legal and factual investi-
gation substantially deviated from the duty to
investigate as adapted from the ABA standards.8
4
Chief Judge Bazelon then addressed the possibility
79 See account of unreported evidentiary hearing in
Tague, supra note 2, at 119-21.
8Id.
81 Id.
82 The motion was denied on April 23, 1975. Decoster
III, slip op. at 5 (Leventhal, J.).
83 Decoster II, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).84 Id., slip op. at 16-19.
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of prejudice and held that where evidence of prej-
udice was unavailable, the court would presume
that prejudice resulted.85 This result had the prac-
tical effect of discharging the defendant's burden
without the necessity of a judicial reexamination
of the actual effect of the trial attorney's actions.
The presumption of prejudice shifted the burden
to the government to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that there was in fact no constitutional
error.'
5 Because of the absence of witnesses or
evidence going to the issue of a possible alibi and
because of the faulty memories of the participants
in the original trial, the government could not meet
its burden on the available facts, and accordingly
the court reversed.'
Judge MacKinnbn again dissented. He argued
that the majority, in its zeal to develop its analysis
of the standard and allocation of the burden of
proof, had failed to consider the guilt of the de-
fendant. After reviewing the findings of the eviden-
tiary hearings, Judge MacKinnon concluded that
Decoster was guilty as charged and that the trial
attorney, upon learning this for himself, was re-
lieved of performing an investigation.88
Judge MacKinnon saw difficulties with trans-
forming the advisory ABA standards into affirma-
tive duties. He reasoned that the majority was
insensitive to the discretion that must be afforded
to defense counsel. He accused the court of substi-
tuting, several years after the fact, its judgment of
trial strategy for that of a competent, if unenthu-
siastic, trial attorney. 8
Judge MacKinnon objected most to the major-
ity's use of the presumption of prejudice to meet
the defendant's burden of proof. Judge Mac-
Kinnon argued that the defendant should have to
prove actual prejudice to his defense by the actions
of trial counsel to overturn his conviction. 90 Actual
prejudice was related to the existence of evidence
that would tend to raise a reasonable doubt of
guilt. Judge MacKinnon argued that the burden
therefore had to rest on the defendant, because
only he was in a position to have access to the




On March 17, 1977, the District of Columbia
Circuit granted the government's motion for re-
8 Id. at 20-22.
8 Id. at 23-24.
87 d. at 25.
s8 Id. at 41 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 23.
90 Id. at 50.
91 Id. at 52.
hearing en banc and vacated the Decoster II panel
decision. Although Decoster's conviction was af-
firmed, the court was severely divided.92
Judge Leventhal's Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion, written by Judge Leven-
thai, followed the Supreme Court in distinguishing
between cases where state statutes impaired the
effectiveness of counsel and those where the sixth
amendment violation resulted from the low quality
of counsel's representation. 93 For the former cases,
the plurality accepted the applicability of a per se
rule precluding the use of harmless error analysis;
but for the latter, it interpreted the Supreme Court
decisions as requiring a noncategorical, factual ap-
proach.94
From decisions in other lower courts and in its
own circuit, the plurality abstracted a two-step
approach that combined the standard of perform-
ance with the allocation of the burden of proof:
The claimed inadequacy must be a serious incom-
petency that falls measurably below the perform-
ance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers. And the
accused must bear the initial burden of demonstrat-
ing a likelihood that counsel's inadequacy affected
the outcome of the trial. Once the appellant has
made this initial showing, the burden passes to the
Government, and the conviction cannot survive
unless the Government demonstrates that it is not
tainted by the deficiency, and that in fact no prej-
udice resulted.95
The plurality then examined the case at hand.
Judge Leventhal said that defense counsel has an
affirmative duty to investigate possible defenses,
although the scope of the duty varies from case to
case. In short, the reviewing court can only appraise
the scope and possible effect of investigation "in
light of the information available to the
attorney."9 While noting that counsel might have
interviewed several potential witnesses, such as the
bartender at the Golden Gate Bar or the desk clerk
9
'There was no opinion for the court. Instead, the
majority vote for affirmance was obtained by a combi-
nation of a plurality consisting of Judges Leventhal,
McGowan, Tamm, and Wilkey, and a concurring bloc of
Judges MacKinnon, Tamm, and Robb. Judge Robinson
concurred only in the result. He joined in a statement
filed by Chief Judge Wright for himself and Judge Ba-
zelon. Judge Bazelon also filed his own dissent which was
joined by Wright. Judge Bazelon, who remained on the
court, was replaced as Chief Judge by Wright. The
combined opinions total 225 pages in the original slip
opinion.
93 See notes 17, 23, & 26 and accompanying text supra.
9 Decoster III, slip op. at 5-13 (Leventhal, J.).9 5Id. at 21.
9 Id. at 24.
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at the D.C. Annex Hotel, the plurality found noth-
ing in the record to indicate that their testimony
would have helped the defense.97 In addition, the
plurality criticized the trial attorney's failure to
interview Eley until moments before trial, but held
that the defendant had not shown any prejudice
from this error.
98
Judge MacKinnon's Concurring Opinion
In a concurrence joined by Judges Tamm and
Robb, Judge MacKinnon reiterated many of the
points he had advanced in his two earlier dissents,
devoting most of his opinion to the burden of proof
issue. Again, Judge MacKinnon would require the
defendant to show more than the possible outcome
effect mandated by the plurality. The defendant
must show "that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
inadequacy" before the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment for a harmless error argument:
If the defendant makes the requisite prima facie
showing of a substantial violation of the constitu-
tional duty owed him by counsel that resulted in
substantial unfair prejudice to his defense, the bur-
den of proceeding shifts to the Government. Then
the Government has a right to show, for example,
that the alleged witnesses did not exist or could not
be located, or that counsel was given no indication
that such witnesses did exist, or that the testimony
of the witnesses was irrelevant or otherwise deficient.
97 Decoster claimed that his representation was ineffec-
tive because of the following:
(1) Counsel was dilatory in seeking a bond review
while appellant was incarcerated for almost
five months following his arrest on May 29,
1970;
(2) Counsel failed to obtain a transcript of appel-
lant's preliminary hearing and failed to employ
that transcript to impeach prosecution wit-
nesses at trial;
(3) Counsel failed to interview any potential wit-
nesses at trial;
(4) Counsel announced "ready" for trial at a time
when he did not know whether or not he would
present any alibi witnesses and before he had
fully developed his defense;
(5) Counsel offered to waive jury trial and to per-
mit appellant to be tried before the court when
the court had heard a part of the evidence in
connection with the guilty pleas of the two
codefendants;
(6) Counsel failed to make an opening statement;
and
(7) Counsel failed to see that appellant's sentence
was properly executed, in that he failed to see
that appellant was given credit for time served.
Id at 27 n.85.
MId. at 29-31.
SId. at 11 (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (emphasis
deleted).
If despite the Government's effort to rebut the
evidence presented by the defendant, the defendant
eventually carries his burden-he demonstrates that
a substantial violation of a duty owed him by
counsel resulted in substantial unfair prejudice to
his defense-then a constitutional violation has oc-
curred.10°
Judge MacKinnon again emphasized the relia-
bility of the verdict as the controlling considera-
tion. He reviewed the record of the evidentiary
hearing more exhaustively than had Judge Lev-
enthal and concluded that an investigation by the
trial attorney would have discovered nothing sig-
nificantly helpful to Decoster.10 '
In a dissent joined by Judge Bazelon, Chief
Judge Wright noted that the two dissenters agreed
with Judge Robinson, who had concurred in the
result, on two "fundamental principles." First, De-
coster I had established the standard of performance
for counsel; second, where a defendant demon-
strates that counsel failed to meet the standard
"the defendant has been denied his constitutional
right to counsel and his conviction must be reversed
unless the Government proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the ineffective assistance of counsel was
harmless."' ' 2
The dissenting opinion largely restated the panel
majority decisions in Decoster I and Decoster . The
dissenters saw the key issue of the case as a mani-
festation of the general indifference of society to
the needs and problems of the poor. 03 The dissent
urged the majority to take notice of the inadequacy
of legal services provided by court-appointed attor-
neys and to take a decisive step to solve the prob-
lem.'0
4
The dissenters saw three elements in an ineffec-
tive legal assistance claim:
1) Did counsel violate one of the articulated duties?
2) Was the violation "substantial"?
3) Has the Government established that no preju-
dice resulted?s 5
The dissenters regarded the standards mandated
in Decoster I as minimum requirements applicable
to all criminal defense cases. Judge Bazelon con-
tended that the evidentiary hearing showed that
the trial attorney, in addition to his failure to
investigate, had neglected to confer with Decoster
at regular intervals for reasonable lengths of
time.1' 6 On the whole, the dissent characterized the
10o Id. at 34-35.
' Id. at 38-39, 51.102 Id. at 1 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
i04 Id. at 2 n.3.
105 Id. at 26.
06Id. at 36.
trial attorney's preparation as so "perfunctory"
and superficial as to amount to a clear violation of
the duties he owed to the defendant.
07
The dissent next examined the substantiality of
the violations. Judge Bazelon argued that the ex-
istence of violations triggered further inquiry into
their frequency and pervasiveness and into whether
the departure from the checklist standard was jus-
tified or excused w" 8 He found the trial attorney's
behavior from appointment to execution of sen-
tence to be one of continuous carelessness.'
°9
On the issue of prejudice, the dissent argued that
automatic reversal of the conviction was required
unless the government could prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the constitutional error was
harmless." 0 The dissent found that in the eviden-
tiary hearing the government had failed to show
that the "gross omissions" of the trial attorney were
without consequence."'
Judge Robinson's Opinion
While he agreed with the dissent's statement of
the applicable law, Judge Robinson concurred in
the result." 2 But unlike the dissent, he found that
the government had carried its burden of proof on
the prejudice issue.'13 Judge Robinson concluded
that no amount of prejudice from ineffective coun-
sel could outweigh the number of prosecution wit-
nesses and their consistent testimony identifying
Decoster as one of Crump's assailants. 114 He could
conceive of nothing that Decoster could offer to
overcome the "direct and positive proof" mustered
by the government's eyewitnesses."5
Analysis of Decoster III
In Decoster III the District of Columbia Circuit
unanimously agreed that the demands of the sixth
amendment only could be met by replacing the
old "farce and mockery" rule with a reasonable
attorney standard. The reasonable attorney stan-
dard, however, is subject to a wide variety of
interpretations. The standard can be open-ended,
107 Id. at 34.
'08 Id. at 41.
"0
9 Id. at 42.
"
0 Id. at 60-6 1. This argument is particularly disturb-
ing when read in light of the dissent's earlier statement
that "[ijt is no secret that in most criminal prosecutions
the defendant is in fact guilty." Id. at 52.
.. Id. at 60.
112 See note 92 supra.
113 Id. at 39-40 (Robinson, J., concurring in the result).
114 Id. at 40 n. 156.
115 Id.
as Judge Leventhal and Judge MacKinnon would
have it," 6 or it can consist of a list of specific duties
as Judge Bazelon urges. 117 Further debate must
consider the Supreme Court's activity in the
area.18 Still, several directions are possible on the
issues of prejudice and harmless error.
Assuming a consensus on a uniform standard of
conduct and a demonstration of a violation of that
standard, a court may (1) require the defendant to
show agtual prejudice to his defense because of the
violation; (2) require the defendant to demonstrate
that the violation resulted in likely prejudice; or
(3) presume that prejudice has resulted. These
alternatives lead to a harmless error analysis if the
defendant meets his burden, but the directions are
analytically distinct.
Judge MacKinnon argued in favor of the first
approach: requiring the defendant to prove actual
prejudice." 9 This standard reflects an exacting in-
terpretation of the elements necessary for a sixth
amendment claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The actual prejudice test eliminates the possi-
bility of manipulation by a result-oriented court
because the court must identify some tangible fac-
tor that damaged the effectiveness of the defense:
the friendly witness not interviewed, the motion
unfiled, the persuasive defense unargued. Also, the
prosecution's harmless error argument will be more
focused under the actual prejudice test because it
will address the effect of a special prejudicial inci-
dent in the trial as a whole.
The second alternative, the likely-prejudice rule,
suffers from vagueness that creates difficulties of
implementation. The nature of the defendant's
burden is uncertain. Presumably, the rule means
that the mere possibility of prejudice is not enough;
the defendant must present clear and convincing
evidence of prejudice."20 Unfortunately Judge Lev-
enthal, who advocated this rule,121 did not clarify
the meaning of likelihood.
The third alternative is to grant the defendant
a presumption of prejudice. Several possible forms
of presumption could be used, such as a rebuttable
presumption for all violations, an irrebuttable pre-
sumption for certain egregious circumstances, or a
presumption limited to certain fact situations.
116 See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
:7 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
18 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
119 See text accompanying notes 99 & 100 supra.
20 It seems Judge Leventhal would require more than
a mere preponderance of the evidence by his choice of
the term "likely."
121 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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Judge Bazelon followed his opinion in Decoster II
and argued that a presumption of prejudice result-
ing from an attorney's violation arises only where
the absence of essential facts make impossible a
determination of whether the defendant has been
prejudiced. Nevertheless, some of the language of
the Decoster III dissent is quite expansive in light of
the likelihood of prejudice and the small chance
that the prosecution will be able to show harmless
error.122 This follows from Judge Bazelon's rejec-
tion of the distinction between state interference
with the right to effective counsel and a claim
based on the incompetency of counsel. If this dis-
tinction is illusory, it would seem that the dictum
of Chapman v. Californiatss to the effect that the right
to counsel is never subject to a harmless error
inquiry would apply to all ineffective counsel cases.
However, Judge Bazelon himself rejects this result.
The differences in legal theory between Judge
MacKinnon and Judge Bazelon are at times sub-
sidiary to their differences in social philosophy.
Judge Bazelon and Chief Judge Wright sought to
formulate a rule applicable to ineffective counsel
situations in order to compensate for the general
indifference of society to the needs and problems
of the poor.'2' These dissenters spent some time
considering how to establish and implement mini-
mum standards of effectiveness. One of their most
controversial suggestions would enable the trial
judge to require counsel to submit a checklist of
pretrial preparation before the judge would permit
the case to go forward.ls 5 In response to criticism
that such a close supervisory role for the court
would drastically alter the adversary system, the
dissenters asserted that, given the chronically low
quality of appointed counsel, such supervision was




"2 "It may be that the prejudice to the defendant
from the denial of effective assistance of counsel is
so great, and the likelihood that the government
can prove lack of prejudice so small, that reversal
should be required whenever a substantial violation
of counsel's duties is shown.... (I)t may be that
only a rule requiring automatic reversal can provide
the deterrent effect necessary to insure that all
defendants-innocent or guilty-receive the effec-
tive assistance of courisel." Slip op. at 66 (Bazelon,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
386 U.S. at 23 n.8. The Court cited Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, in the footnote as an example of a
situation where harmless error does not apply. For a brief
discussion of Gideon, see text accompanying note 21 supra.
124 Decoster III, slip op. at 70, (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
'25Id. at 73.
126 Id. at 74-75 (emphasis deleted).
Disagreeing with the Bazelon-Wright position,
Judge MacKinnon contended that the "philosophy
of the dissent', 127 had led to a'n "injudicial appeal
to sympathy" for the poor:
The dissent plays the theme from Griffin v. Illinois,
"[t]hat there can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has." But there is nothing in the record to
indicate that Decoster's poverty caused him to com-
mit robbery or prevented him from receiving a fair
trial. Increased billions have been spent in recent
years to alleviate poverty, but during this period all
forms of crime have soared.... [The dissent's] my-
opic view ofjustice overlooks justice for the public,
and for that far larger number of poor Americans
who are the victims of crime.1ss
While Judge MacKinnon admitted that the dis-
senters' goals were "asperational," he contended
that the judiciary alone could not realistically im-
plement such goals.12
Amidst the legal and political arguments of the
court still existed Willie Decoster's essential claim
that he was denied the effective assistance of coun-
sel. The facts evidence some support for this con-
tention. The trial attorney did not expend substan-
tial effort in representing his client. Since he had
to rely on his memory at the evidentiary hearing,
he apparently kept no detailed files of the case.
This fact alone demonstrates a lack of preparation
and dedication. Nevertheless, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the actions of Decoster's attorney makes
a comparison between his actual defense and that
which a reasonable attorney would have pursued
problematic.
Yet even assuming that the trial attorney's con-
duct fell below the reasonable attorney standard,
one must ask what effect this had on the outcome
of the case. A court will not grant relief to a
defendant denied effective assistance of counsel
unless the defendant can show prejudice to his
cause.13° Since Decoster could not point to any-
thing a more competent attorney could have done
to render more effective assistance in his case, he
did not demonstrate prejudice. Decoster could not
substantiate his alibi defense, since he knew neither
the names nor the whereabouts of any witnesses
who could testify that he was some place other
than at the scene of the crime. In contrast, the
government produced eyewitnesses who never lost
127 Id. at 47 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
' Id. at 58-59.
12 Decoster III, slip op. at 41-42 (Leventhal, J.).
" See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
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sight of the fleeing Decoster from the time the
crime was committed until he was arrested and
identified by Crump. Taken together with Decos-
ter's statements in his letters, this evidence provides
a rational basis for the jury's verdict.
1n. CONCLUSION:
WHAT RULE SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND How
SHOULD IT BE APPLIED?
A. THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT
The Decoster case demonstrates that, although
members of the judiciary agree that the sixth
amendment requires some standard of conduct by
counsel, they cannot agree upon the content and
articulation of that standard. However, a careful
review of judicial arguments reveals a workable
standard for effective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the stan-
dard forjudging counsel's assistance consists of the
"range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases."' 3 ' Although some commentators
argue that this broad directive must be given more
detailed "content,"' 3 2 it seems that the Court in-
tended to enunciate a generally applicable stan-
dard. The Supreme Court could have pronounced
a categorical standard, listing specific duties for
appointed counsel. Instead, the Court chose to
recognize a range of permissive conduct for counsel
in similar factual situations as determined by the
practice of his locality at the time he provided
representation. sss Thus, the attempt to define a
specific code of defense counsel behavior by the
Decoster III dissenters is inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court guidelines.
The Supreme Court rejected the checklist ap-
proach for persuasive reasons. Most important, the
imposition of specific duties on defense counsel and
the continuing supervision of counsel's representa-
tion by the state would improperly interfere with
the adversary process. Any enforcement of checklist
duties would be accomplished by the trial court or,
worse, the prosecution. Such a transfer of the de-
fense initiative to the trial court evokes, as Judge
Leventhal stated, the inquisitorial system ofjuris-
prudence prevailing in Europe.ss Such a funda-
mental restructuring of the American criminal jus-
tice system only should be undertaken by the leg-
islature. In the meantime, just as pro-prosecution
' Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 264 (quoting
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 770-71).
132 E.g., Note, supra note 48, at 781.
'33 See note 33 supra.
'3 Decoster III, slip op. at 40 (Leventhal, J.).
intervention may violate the sixth amandment, 35
so also may close judicial supervision of the defense
imbalance the adversary system.
Secondly, a mechanical application of a set of
minimum standards to the performance of counsel
may fail to consider the nuances, hunches, and
forgotten circumstances that led counsel to under-
take a particular course of action. Moreover, Judge
Bazelon's selection of the ABA standards as the
minimum level of conduct contravenes the drafters'
intent that the standards be only advisory.' 36Judge
MacKinnon feared that the use of supposedly ad-
visory guidelines quickly will become rigid rules
embodying the exclusive consideration of the is-
sue. 137 Specified rules of conduct are unworkable
because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are inseparable from the factual situations from
which they arise. While the unprincipled, ad hoc
review of counsel's performance, such as the farce
and mockery test, is insufficient, the alternate ap-
proach of a categorical checklist approach is not
appropriate to the various factual settings of inef-
fectiveness of counsel claims.
Finally, minimum guidelines cannot effectively
encompass all questionable instances of counsel's
behavior. Commentators sympathetic to the idea
of utilizing guidelines have pointed to many situ-
ations which the ABA standards do not cover.
These situations include instances in which counsel
withholds information from the client, las under-
takes no investigation because counsel, based upon
experience with similar cases, believes investigation
to be of little value, 139 or fears that an investigation
will only uncover material damaging to the
client. 40
B. PREJUDICE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF, AND HARM-
LESS ERROR
Unlike the standard of conduct, the Supreme
Court has not explicitly allocated the burden of
i15 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
136 The ABA disclaimed any attempt to create a con-
stitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel:
These standards are intended as guides for conduct
of lawyers and as the basis for disciplinary action,
not as criteria for judicial evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of counsel to determine the validity of a
conviction; they may or may not be relevant in such
judicial evaluation of the effectiveness of counsel,
depending upon all the circumstances.
ABA STANDARDS § 1.1() at 154.
137 Decoster III, slip op. at 14 n.15 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
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proof as to prejudice nor applied the harmless error
doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel cases.
Of all of the alternatives discussed in Decoster 111,141
that forwarded by Judge MacKinnon is the best:
a violation of the standard must result in actual
prejudice to constitute constitutional error, and the
prosecution must be afforded an opportunity to
demonstrate that the error was harmless.1 42 A re-
view of the sixth amendment precedents demon-
strates the strength of this view.
In cases where no counsel has been provided or
where the state has impaired counsel's perform-
ance, claims of sixth amendment violations do not
require a showing of prejudice since these situations
are inherently prejudicial. 43 In contrast to these
situations of inherent prejudice, the ineffective as-
sistance of counsel due to lack of diligence or
preparation may be prejudicial only in certain
circumstances. Since the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim does not arise through the fault or
impediment of the state, it is a less egregious viola-
tion of the sixth amendment than the prosecution's
impairment of counsel's effort or the court's failure
to appoint counsel at all.' 44 More importantly,
ineffective assistance of counsel claims require a
different analysis by reviewing courts than the
other sixth amendment cases. In most sixth amend-
ment cases, the reviewing court is presented with
an objective problem: either counsel was appointed
and allowed to confer with his client or not. The
basis of the claim of ineffective assistance, however,
requires a more detailed and difficult examination
of counsel's efforts and abilities in a specific factual
situation. This necessarily amorphous inquiry into
counsel's effectiveness calls for demonstration of
actual prejudice to the defendant in order to pro-
vide relief only in warranted circumstances.
Postconviction relief is warranted where the de-
fendant is arguably innocent. 45 Ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims satisfy this precondition
because the defendant must demonstrate actual
141 See text accompanying notes 94-110 supra.
142 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
143 See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
144 The other two sixth amendment claims are non-
appointment of counsel and government impairment of
counsel. See text accompanying notes 20 & 26 supra.
45 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)
("overriding concern" is the "justice of the finding of
guilt"). Cf Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233,
239 (1977) (the purpose of the burden of proof is "to
prevent the erroneous conviction of innocent persons");
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) ("[T]he ulti-
mate question of guilt or innocence ... should be the
central concern of a criminal proceeding.").
prejudice to his defense. When a defendant can
establish prejudice, he can contend that counsel's
derelictions injured his case, thereby undermining
the reliability of the verdict. It is reasonable to
require the defendant to challenge the verdict's
reliability since the party who has access to infor-
mation relevant to the disposition of issues in liti-
gation should carry the burden of proof on those
issues. 146 Only the defendant is in a position to
know which facts his counsel failed to utilize. Plac-
ing the burden on the defendant to demonstrate
both derelictions of counsel and the prejudice of
such derelictions is as necessary as it is fair.
It is also fair to allow the prosecution to dem-
onstrate that counsel's ineffective assistance was
harmless. Just as the demonstration of prejudice
indicates that the defendant is arguably innocent,
the harmless error rule permits the prosecution to
rebut this innocence by showing that the prosecu-
tion's inculpating evidence outweighs any excul-
pating effect which the proper assistance of counsel
might have had on the outcome of the case.
1 47
Should the prosecution meet this burden, relief
must be denied to the defendant.
In sum, the Supreme Court has stated that the
standard of performance applicable in ineffective
assistance of counsel cases must be that of a reason-
able attorney. The Supreme Court has not an-
swered the central question raised by more recent
litigation such as Decoster as to how the burden of
proof in these cases is to be allocated or whether
the harmless error doctrine is applicable. Judge
MacKinnon is correct in arguing that the defend-
ant has the burden of demonstrating that a viola-
tion of the standard of attorney conduct occurred
and that the violation resulted in actual prejudice
to his case. The prosecution should also be afforded
the opportunity to demonstrate that the violation
was harmless. The reasons for placing this require-
ment on the defendant are the seriousness of the
constitutional error alleged, the predication of post-
conviction relief on arguable innocence, and the
traditional notions of allocation of burdens of
proof. Admittedly this formulation of the rule
places a burden on the defendant that is greater
than some would say is appropriate.4a But when
146 See Decoster III, slip op. at 23-25 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
147 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
148 Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel A New Look After United States v.
Decoster, supra note 48, argues that the imposition of a
proof-of-prejudice requirement upon the defendant is
unfair and unjustified. The note suggests a "comprehen-
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the equities are balanced it does not seem unfair to
burden those beneficiaries of government largess
who subsequently complain about the quality of
what they receive. A lighter burden for the defend-
sive approach" to the problem of ineffective assistance of
counsel. This approach would employ appellate court
guidelines such as those set out by Judge Bazelon's De-
coster III dissent and relieve the defendant of the necessity
to prove prejudice by placing the entire burden of proof
on the government, judicial "monitoring" of counsel's
pre-trial preparation, and expanded financial and sup-
port resources for the criminal defense bar. Id. at 781.
The note argues that a checklist approach is necessary to
guarantee effective assistance of counsel and that such a
standard would be "eviscerated" by requiring the de-
fendant to prove prejudice. Id.
The note criticizes the Leventhal approach of requir-
ing the defendant to demonstrate likely prejudice because
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ant would elevate the most intangible and unrev-
iewable of claims beyond the criminal justice sys-
tem's overriding concern with guilt and innocence.
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it permits a defendant to "go to jail even when all concede
that his counsel substantially failed to represent him." Id.
at 768. Yet this is only the case where the defendant
could not demonstrate that the failures of counsel did not
result in prejudice to him and, therefore, the guilty
verdict remains valid. The error that the note makes is in
not accepting the possibility of inconsequential, nonpre-
judicial violations of the standard of effective assistance.
Thus, the imposition of a proof-of-prejudice requirement
upon the defendant is necessary to ensure that appellate
relief is granted only in appropriate cases and is not, as
the author of the note maintains, an impediment con-
structed merely to make proving allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel more difficult.
